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wife's separate portion of the recovery been properly submitted in earlier
cases, courts would have reached different conclusions."
V. CONCLUSION
Franco and Kirkpatrick have put forth the best arguments for the consti-
tutionality of article 4615. The inequity of denying a spouse separate property
recovery for injuries to his or her person would now appear to be alleviated.
The reasoning and result in the two cases are supported both by the legisla-
tive history of the new article 4615 "° and the comments of those who have
argued the inequity of the community property defense. 0
Thomas R. Matthews
Prior Notice and Hearing Before Attaching a
Badge of Disgrace
A Wisconsin statute gave certain persons the power to prevent the sale
of intoxicating beverages to "drunks."' The justification for this power was
to prevent such an individual from endangering the well-being of himself,
his family, and his community The police chief of Hartford, Wisconsin,
acting pursuant to the statute, caused Mrs. Constantineau's name to be "post-
ed" in all local retail liquor outlet stores as one to whom intoxicating bever-
ages could not be sold. The statute did not require a hearing before posting,
and Mrs. Constantineau had no prior notice or opportunity to contest the
posting of her name. Mrs. Constantineau sought and was granted injunctive
relief by a three-judge federal court.' That court found the statute unconstitu-
tional on procedural due process grounds-the absence of any provisions
for prior notice and opportunity to be heard. The United States Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction.4 Held, affirmed: "Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity are at stake because of what the gov-
ernment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
tion of art. 4615, see Reeves v. Rodriguez, 458 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1970), where the court held that fact situations which occurred prior to Jan. 1, 1968
(effective date of art. 4615) were not affected by art. 4615. The court did not deal with the
constitutional issue but merely said that "under the statutory and case law as it existed at
the time the cause of action accrued, the recovery of the plaintiffs for the injury would have
been community property." 458 S.W.2d at 548.
" No. 8026, at 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, Sept. 28, 1971).
" McKnight, Personal Injury as Separate Property, 3 TEX. TRIAL LAW. F. 7 (1968).
40 Green, The Community Property Defense in Personal Injury and Death Actions, 33
TEXAS L. REv. 88 (1954).
1 "'[The wife of such person, . . . supervisors, . . . mayor, chief of police . . . alder-
men. . . . trustees, . . . superintendent of the poor, . . . chairman of the county board of
supervisors, . . . district attorney, . . . may . . . forbid all persons knowingly to sell or give
away to such person any intoxicating liquors ....... WIS. STAT. 5 176.26 (1957). Id. S
176.28 makes the sale or gift of liquor to such persons a misdemeanor.
2 Id. § 176.26.
1 Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861 (F.D. Wis. 1969).
4 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 397 U.S. 985 (1970).
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NOTES
I. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
"It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference
between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to
strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal
justice under law."5
The concept of due process is elusive and incapable of precise definition.'
It has been described as "the primary and indispensable foundation of indi-
vidual freedom . . . the basic and essential term in the social compact which
defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise."7 Central to this concept are the requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard,8 which are essential to the preservation of our
adversary system of justice.9
A. Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard
The opportunity to be heard before condemnation of property or person
is a notion deeply rooted in the common law.1" Indeed, the right to be heard
has been called "the fundamental requisite of due process"'" and "prerequi-
site to due process." The requirement of a hearing, however, is far from
absolute. Rather, it is prefaced with the existence of a "sufficient" interest in
the aggrieved party and the absence of an "overriding" interest in the govern-
ment." It is the relative weight of these interests which determines the
necessity of prior hearing.
What constitutes a sufficient interest or right is a problem which plagues
the courts less now than it did in the past.' The well-known doctrine of
5Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
8 'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and
its content varies according to specific factual contents . . . . Whether the
Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding
depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right in-
volved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that pro-
ceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.
Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1966).
8 "By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882) (quoting Daniel Webster's definition of due
process from Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819)).
9 "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to
be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of juris-
prudence ...... In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1947).
10 Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873). See also Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S.
409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 276 (1876); Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819).
" Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
"'Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
13 "The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a
determination of governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and
to meet . . . unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts, except in rare circumstances when
some other interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding of the interest in a fair
hearing." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 412 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
" "No longer is the usual inquiry the relatively crude one of whether a party is entitled
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"privilege" is so riddled with exceptions that it may be fairly classified as
nonexistent in the fields in which it was once problematic." Many cases have
held that a constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that
the private interest involved is only a "privilege" and not a "right."" The
courts are no longer willing to rely on such an inflexible classification; instead,
they are taking a realistic look at the impact of the governmental action in
determining the reach of due process."
To be balanced against the sufficient private interest is the interest behind
the governmental action.' As a general rule, an emergency or an overriding
interest is not enough to dispense with a hearing requirement altogether."
But summary governmental action may be deemed justified under certain
circumstances and the hearing suspended until a later date." Some sort of
belated hearing requirement is generally found, even in the face of a situa-
tion too urgent for a prior hearing." Such a situation usually places the
preservation and repose of the community or the protection of a large class
to 'hearing.' More often it is, as it should be, into the question of what kind of hearing is
appropriate. 1 DAVIS § 7.20, at 367 (Supp. 1970).
"The basic idea of "privilege" is that a person does not have a right to something the
government has provided gratuitously or something which has not been enunciated as a
right per se. Under the "privilege" doctrine, if a private citizen had an injured interest
which was not a right per se, he was precluded from asserting hearing requirements and
other due process protections. The interest of the citizen, in effect, was not worthy of pro-
tection. For a comprehensive discussion see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
"See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Thorpe v.
Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (public housing); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967) (disbarment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment com-
pensation); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (social security); Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955) (public employment); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cit. 1964) (liquor store license); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961) (education at state college). Contra, Dyer v. SEC, 287 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1966); In re
Tucker, 486 P.2d 657, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1971).
7 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), in which the Court found that a cost
requirement for divorce proceedings offended due process because it deprived a certain
class of the opportunity to be heard. "Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at
a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
...must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Early in our jurisprudence, this
Court voiced the doctrine that '(w)herever one is assailed in his person or his property,
there he may defend.' " Id. at 377.
" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In this case the Court formally abandoned
the traditional notion of viewing welfare benefits as a mere gratuity subject to summary
action. A balancing test was substituted, and the Court held that the plaintiff's interest (in
a means of survival) outweighed the "government's interest in conserving fiscal and ad-
ministrative resources." Id. at 265.
" An exception appears in national security cases, in which a hearing requirement may
be completely overridden by the governmental interest in suppressing evidence and sources.
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (private em-
ployee denied access to military base for "security" reasons). See also Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). This exception has been criticized by Justice
Brennan: "[Tlhe government official ...may employ 'security requirements' as a blind be-
hind which to dismiss at will for the most discriminatory of causes." 367 U.S. at 900 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
"'See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of
mislabeled vitamin product); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (action of con-
servator taking possession of a bank); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211
U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of food not fit for human use); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC,
299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962) (suspension of exemption
from stock registration requirement).
"See, e.g., note 20 supra.
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of people in such jeopardy that an exception to procedural safeguards be-
comes necessary.*
Once a hearing requirement is established, the concerned parties must be
informed of the pendency of the hearing. The requirement of notice is an
essential complement of the right to be heard. In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co.' the Supreme Court stated: "This right to be heard has little
reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."' 4 Notice
must be in a form reasonably calculated to apprise the affected parties of the
action against them and provide a reasonable time and opportunity to be
heard.' Thus, post-hearing notice has been held inadequate.'
B. Circumvention of the Privilege Concept
When a private interest falls short of being a right per se, the courts
have taken several approaches in determining whether the interest affected
is entitled to due process protections." Three such approaches are: (1) the
traditional due process requirements applied to the infringement of a private
interest;"8 (2) the newer method of balancing the particular private and
governmental interests;" (3) the underlying necessity of curbing arbitrary
discretion in the hands of officials.'
Traditional Due Process. The essence of this approach is that the government
must act fairly even though it has the authority to control a particular area.
The classification of an interest as a privilege instead of a right has been
held not to free the government from its responsibility to act with fairness."'
Powell v. Alabama? illustrates this concept. There the Court, in effect, ad-
' See notes 19, 20 supra.
m339 U.S. 306 (1950).T Id. at 314.
, This standard was said to be an "elementary and fundamental" requirement of due
process. Id.
"2See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S.
126 (1941); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Londoner v. City
& County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). The above cases dealt with "property" rights,
but the principle is the same when the private interest subjected to harm or loss involves
"liberty" or "quasi-property" rights. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (sus-
pension of automobile license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (failure to give a divorced
father notice of pending proceedings for the adoption of his child); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 194 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (student
entitled to notice and opportunity for hearing before he could be expelled from a tax-
supported college). See also Gayton v. Cassidy, 317 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd,
403 U.S. 902 (1971) (in view of Bell v. Burson, supra).
"
2 See generally 1 DAVIS § 7.12 (1958); Van Alstyne, supra note 15.
"2Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 1451.
"
2 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
21 "One may not have [a] constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government
may not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant with due process of law."
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Judge Fahey's well-known
statement supported the court's conclusion that charges of unsuitability for a radio tele-
graph license required a hearing, and the absence of such a hearing was a denial of due
process.
32287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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mitted that although the state's provision for court-appointed counsel was
not constitutionally required,"3 the right to counsel, if given, must be admin-
istered fairly. The government may dispense gratuities, but, unlike private
entities, it is bound by the requirements of procedural due process. Thus,
an individual may not have a right per se to governmental largess, 4 but he
does have a right to fair treatment in the administration of that largess. Even
in areas in which the government's power to set substantive standards may
be unquestionable, the methods of determining whether such standards have
actually been breached must at least comply with minimal procedural safe-
guards.'
Goldberg Balancing Test. In Goldberg v. Kelly' there was a direct confron-
tation with the "right-privilege" dichotomy, but the Supreme Court chose
to apply a more realistic approach. The approach, which weighs the relative
interests of the parties, was not really new. An implicit balancing test was
evident in pre-Goldberg cases determining whether the important right of
the opportunity to be heard should be forfeited. One example is Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy:"7 "[Clonsideration of what procedures
due process may require under any set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."3
There is naturally some overlap between the Goldberg balancing test and
the traditional due process test, which was ostensibly controlling in Cafeteria
Workers. The key difference in Goldberg was the Court's formalization of a
consideration of the actual interests involved. The impact of the government's
action, rather than the perfunctory classification of an interest as a right or
privilege, was the controlling issue.
"Grievous loss""° (actual, substantial, adverse impact on a private interest)
has been used to describe an interest sufficient to require due process protec-
tion, and the flexible nature of such a concept allows realistic remedies. When
a private interest involves freedom from social stigma or loss of reputation,
the familiar label "badge of infamy" has often been applied.' The concept of
' Powell was decided prior to Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which made
the sixth amendment right to counsel applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.
341 DAVIS § 7.12, at 456 (1958).
'Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
30 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
7 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Cafeteria Workers is one of the unusual cases dispensing with
a hearing requirement. The court based its decision on the fact that plaintiff was only losing
a job at a particular military base (her employer had offered her work elsewhere). The
Government's asserted interest was in national security. The dissent argued that more than
a job was at stake: the Government may have attached a "badge of infamy" by labelling
plaintiff a "security risk." Id. at 901-02. For a recent balancing case in which an indigent's
interest in obtaining a legal divorce was held to outweigh the state's interest in preventing
frivolous litigation and maintaining scarce funding, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971).
38 367 U.S. at 895.
" See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.4 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
"' The Supreme Court has used language which indicates that an interest in reputation,
community standing, or future job opportunity is entitled to constitutional protection. This
[Vol. 2 5
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"grievous loss" may also apply to the use of one's wages," or public housing,'
or welfare benefits." A hearing is prerequisite to any such substantial loss
caused by the government.' It is this flexible, realistic evaluation of the dam-
aged private interest that enables the courts to avoid becoming bogged down
with the theoretical determination of whether the interest is life, liberty, or
property under the Federal Constitution."
Arbitrary Discretion. While there is strong authority for the proposition that
arbitrary laws offend due process," the notion of arbitrary discretion in the
hands of public officials has not been frequently used as a controlling issue
in determining hearing requirements. However, when courts faced with "hear-
ing" questions have found that a private interest was injured by the arbitrary
discretion of a government official, without a hearing, a remedy has been
found."
The first application of this test of arbitrary discretion with regard to hear-
ing requirements was in Weiman v. Updegraff."  Completely disregarding
the "privilege" doctrine, the Court said: "We need not pause to consider
concept developed primarily in disloyalty cases which arose at a time when internal com-
munism was seen as a more serious threat than it is today. See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). While loss of reputation as the
result of government action exposing an individual's abuse of alcohol has never been a
controlling issue, dicta recognizing the problem is provided in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968) :
The fact that a high percentage of American alcoholics conceal their drink-
ing problems, not merely by avoiding public displays of intoxication, but also
by shunning all forms of treatment, is indicative that some powerful deter-
rent operates to inhibit the public revelation of the existence of alcoholism.
Quite probably this deterrent effect can be largely attributed to the harsh
moral attitude which our society has traditionally taken toward intoxication
and the shame which we have associated with alcoholism. Criminal convic-
tion represents the degrading public revelation of what Anglo-American
society has long condemned as a moral defect, and the existence of criminal
sanctions may serve to reinforce this cultural taboo, just as we presume it
serves to reinforce other, stronger feelings against murder, rape, theft, and
other forms of antisocial conduct.
Id. at 530-31.
41 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach involved another Wis-
consin statute that provided for prejudgment wage garnishment. The Supreme Court struck
down the statute, refusing to accept the contention that plaintiff had not lost a property
right, but merely the use of that property before the hearing. The Court realistically ac-
knowledged the impact on the plaintiff of having his wages inaccessible pending the final
outcome.
4 Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
"Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1Id. at 261. See generally Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
4'The "privilege" doctrine requires an injury to a vested right (life, liberty, or property)
before remedial action under the due process clause becomes available. This has .engendered
scholastic interpretations of what is included or excluded from life, liberty; or property.
See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 15.4 7
"[Tjhe guaranty of due process as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious . . . ." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 525 (1933). See also Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1953).
48 See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Horns-
by v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.
Idaho 1965); State v. Parham, 412 P.2d 142 (Okla. 1966).
49344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say
that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose ex-
clusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."50 The
protection embraces not only the specific interest at hand, but also a broader
interest in the curtailing of arbitrary action. Hence, the notion that an indi-
vidual should be free from arbitrary action may be a sufficient interest in
itself.51 Mr. Justice Cardozo has characterized the protection of individuals
from arbitrary government action as the essence of due process.5 Thus, the
state may have broad rights in controlling the discharge of its employees5
or the regulation of its liquor licenses;54 nevertheless, "this is something quite
different from a right to act arbitrarily and capriciously."'
The arbitrary discretion test is not without limitations. Difficulty arises
when it is impossible for an individual to prove that an official has acted
arbitrarily. If arbitrariness cannot be proven, the aggrieved party must show
a substantial injury." If neither can be shown, no hearing will be required.57
For the courts to require a hearing in the face of a compelling government
interest, either arbitrary and capricious action must actually be shown, or an
equally compelling private injury must exist."
II. POLICE POWER AND INTOXICATING BEVERAGES
The power of the state to control intoxicating beverages is extremely
5 Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
51Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
"'Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937). The equal
protection clause has also been extended to include this principle. For a case in which Je-
hovah's Witnesses were denied equal protection through "completely arbitrary and dis-
criminatory refusal" to grant park permits, see, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273
(1951).
I'Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1955); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
5 Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
5id. at 609. See also Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (disbar-
ment found to be arbitrary and capricious).
"In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), a citizen
was summarily denied her private employment on a military installation for security reasons.
The Court specifically assumed that petitioner "could not constitutionally have been excluded
. .. if the announced grounds had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 898.
While this was so, in the absence of evidence that the discharge was arbitrary, the Court
denied relief on the theory that a rational reason had been advanced by the Government
(security risk).
5 1 Id.
58Professor Davis explains this apparent inconsistency as follows:
Racial or religious discrimination against a citizen is forbidden by the Con-
stitution in all kinds of governmental activities, whether rights or privileges
or gratuities are affected. A citizen who is thus discriminated against has a
constitutional right to be free from such discrimination whether the interest
that is affected by the discrimination is important or unimportant and whether
it is a right or a privilege or gratuity. A citizen's right to be free from racial
or religious discrimination is a right which can stand alone, irrespective of the
other interests that may be affected or unaffected. But the right to a hearing
is by its intrinsic nature dependent upon what interest is involved; if the
interest is sufficiently insignificant, a hearing may be wasteful. Furthermore,
the right to a hearing may be overridden by opposing interests, such as a na-
tional security interest in nondisclosure of secret information.
1 DAVIS J 7.12, at 337 (Supp. 1970).
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broad." The primary source of this power is the twenty-first amendment,-'
which gives the states broad regulatory power over liquor traffic within their
own territory.' "A state is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause
limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use,
distribution, or consumption within its borders.""2 Thus, there can be no ques-
tion that a state, by the exercise of its authority through the twenty-first
amendment, is fully competent to regulate every phase of traffic in intoxicat-
ing beverages."
Although the states do have broad power to regulate in this area, that
power must be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. This interaction
between the power to regulate alcoholic beverages and the due process clause
was developed by the Supreme Court in Zifirin v. Reeves."
Without doubt a state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants,
their transportation, sale, or possession, irrespective of when or where produced
or obtained, or the use to which they are to be put. Further, she may adopt
measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise
full police authority in respect of them .... Having absolutely the power to
prohibit manufacture, sale, transportation, or possession, . . . (is] it permissible
for [the state] to permit these things only under definitely prescribed con-
ditions?"
The reasonableness of "definitely prescribed conditions" was discussed by
the Fifth Circuit in Hornsby v. Allen."6 That case dispensed with the "privi-
lege" doctrine" as it related to the issuance of liquor licenses, and the court
held that state regulation must comply with due process requirements.
The state may also have an interest in controlling intoxicating beverages
because of the unusual and noxious characteristics of alcohol."9 The Hornsby
court dealt with this assertion by stating:
Neither is the ... menace to public health and welfare a sufficient answer....
The potential social undesirability of the product may warrant absolutely pro-
hibiting it, or . .. imposing restrictions to protect the community from its
harmful influences. But the dangers do not justify [the deprivation) of the cus-
tomary constitutional safeguards. Indeed, the great social interest ... makes an
exceptionally strong case for adherence to proper procedures and access to ju-
dicial review .. .
"See, e.g., Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308
U.S. 132 (1939); Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919); Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S.
304 (1917); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890). See also Note, The Twenty-
First Amendment Grants States Plenary Power Over the Liquor Industry, 8 HOUs. L. REV.
587 (1971).
0 "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
" United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945); cf. Nippert v.
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946).
6" Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964).
65 Id. See also note 59 supra.
' 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
6Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
66326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
"'See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
68 326 F.2d at 609; see note 54 supra, and accompanying text.
o See note 59 supra.
o 326 F.2d at 609.
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III. WISCONSIN V. CONSTANTINEAU
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau"' the Supreme Court recognized the broad
power of the state to regulate and control the evils described in the state
statute."2 The only issue was whether the label or characterization attached
to a person by "posting" established a sufficient interest to warrant due process
requirements of notice and hearing. ' While never so held, it seems unques-
tionable that a "stigma or badge of disgrace"7 would qualify under the "griev-
ous loss" concept as a sufficient private interest."' The Court, recognizing the
primacy of Mrs. Constantineau's interest in her reputation, met the sufficiency
issue squarely. Although the Court did not articulate the particular test it used
in reaching its decision, its treatment of this case indicates that the balancing
test was probably applied.
Using the balancing test, the fact that the interest was not a right per se
would not have had any bearing on the existence of a hearing requirement.M
The lower court dissent" provided a good illustration of the older and dimin-
ishing "right-privilege" dichotomy. "We note that plaintiff's attorney, both in
his brief and in oral argument, conceded the right of his client to drink in-
toxicating liquors is not a right protected by the United States Constitution.""
Even though the proper interest at stake was loss of reputation (not plaintiff's
inability to drink), the lower court dissent apparently would make no dis-
tinction because neither is a right per se under the Constitution. Although the
Supreme Court did not explicitly apply a balancing test, it clearly was not
content to foreclose consideration after classifying drinking as a non-right.
Instead, the impact of the government's action was considered in determining
the severity of the injury to plaintiff's overall interest.0
The total impact of the government's action was to attach a stigma or
badge of disgrace. While the Court used the words "grievous loss" on the
plaintiff's behalf and, on the other hand, spoke of the state's broad power
to deal with the evils of alcohol,"0 the Goldberg balancing test was not enun-
ciated. The result, however, was that the state's interest was held not to over-
ride the individual's interest in "good name, honor, or integrity"' to the elimi-
1400 U.S. 433 (1971).
72 Id. at 436.
73 id.
74 Id.
75 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). For cases on the importance of reputation, see note 41 supra. See also
Willner v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531 (1962); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Idaho 1965).
70 The traditional due process approach, on the other hand, would require only procedural
fairness in determining whether a state interest had been breached. Using that standard in
the principal case, an objective finding that Mrs. Constantineau was indeed abusing the use
of alcohol would have been required before the government could "post" her name. Assum-
ing such a finding could be accomplished without a hearing, this might have been a legiti-
mate state action because plaintiff's interest in purchasing and consuming alcohol fell short
of being a protected right. The Court did not question Wisconsin's authority to control the
sale and consumption of liquor. 400 U.S. at 436.
'
7 Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (Duffy, J., dis-
senting).7 8 /d.
70 See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
0 400 U.S. at 436-37.
" Id. at 437.
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nation of notice and hearing requirements. In effect, the Court said the statute
would not have been declared unconstitutional: (a) had the private interest
been of lesser importance; or (b) if the government's interest had been
compelling or based on an emergency
The Court also used language indicating the presence of the third approach
-arbitrary discretion." While this approach was not controlling, it was obvi-
ously an influential force in granting relief. Still, following the reasoning in
Cafeteria Workers, this approach would require a showing of discrimination,
arbitrariness, or caprice in order to require a hearing on its own strength.
Mrs. Constantineau made no attempt to make such a showing or even deny
the allegations against her. Without this, a sufficient private interest (as op-
posed to the general interest in curbing arbitrary discretion) on which to
base the hearing requirement had to be shown." Since arbitrariness was not
shown, the right to a hearing apparently was not, in itself, strong enough to
overcome the state's interest." Thus, the decision could not be based on arbi-
trary discretion alone.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is significant that the Court did not limit itself to a consideration of
Mrs. Constantineau's inability to purchase alcohol in her home town as her
only interest. The lower court dissenting judge allowed himself to be con-
vinced by this argument" and implied that relief should have been denied
because drinking is a "privilege" and not a "right."8 This approach would
belie the intent of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,"8 and Goldberg;"9 i.e.,
that the impact of government action must be viewed in its realistic applica-
tion-that a loss does not have to be of a "right" to be "grievous," and,
hence, entitled to constitutional protection.
The most telling impact of Constantineau is that it represents an ever-
increasing recognition by the courts of the need of individual protection in
areas which have heretofore been deemed insignificant. The citizens who
most need judicial protection are generally the ones whose lack of legal
82 The lack of any hearing requirement could be justified only by the existence of an
overriding governmental interest comparable to national security. See note 13 supra, and
accompanying text. The record showed no evidence to substantiate the conclusion that plain-
tiff's alleged abuse of alcohol was such a threatening and imminent danger.
83 "She may have been the victim of an official's caprice." 400 U.S. at 437. "And here
the Wisconsin law purports on its face to place such arbitrary and tyrannical power in the
hands of minor officers and others that these modern bills of attainder can be issued ex parte,
without notice or hearing of any kind or character." Id. at 444 (Black, J., dissenting on ab-
stention grounds).
" For a discussion of the state's interest in controlling alcohol and arbitrary discretion,
see Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cit. 1964). See also Barskey v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 470 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "If a State licensing agency lays
bare its arbitrary action, or if the State law explicitly allows it to act arbitrarily, that is the
kind of State action which the Due Process Clause forbids."
85 See note 58 supra, and accompanying text.
88 "Here, it can be stated that while bartenders in Hartford were prohibited from selling
intoxicating liquors to the plaintiff, such prohibition was restricted to the city of Hartford
and for a period of one year." Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 866 (E.D. Wis.
1969) (Duffy, J., dissenting).
87 See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
88 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see note 42 supra.
88397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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sophistication and awareness prevents their assertion of that need." Despite
the absence of a theoretically sound, or scholastically interpreted, right per se,
the wage earner," the welfare recipient,' and now an alleged "town drunk"
have protection from action by the government without a prior hearing.
The dicta in Constantineau maligning the uncurtailed use of discretion is
another healthy sign. 3 This area has been comprehensively analyzed by legal
scholars," and much has been written indicating that the same arbitrary dis-
cretion problems are to be found in the arena of federal agency proceedings.'
Constantineau emphasizes the necessity of hearing guidelines for government
officials who are vested with discretionary power over private citizens."
The Court in Constantineau did not speak of the right to be heard as one
capable of standing on its own strength. However, by expanding constitu-
tional protection to "grievous loss" in the form of a social stigma, the sub-
stance of this concept was accomplished. The Court has subsequently inched
further towards viewing the opportunity to be heard as a right per se. In
Boddie v. Connecticut," after speaking of the vital rights of religious free-
dom, free speech, and assembly, the Court said: "No less than these rights,
the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, within the limits of prac-
ticality, must be protected against denial by particular laws that operate to
jeopardize it for particular individuals.""' This dictum might be expanded to
include other powers which are particularly susceptible to abuse at the hands
of government officials."
The Court's opinion in Constantineau reveals a flexible and realistic ap-
proach. It strips the due process clause of its dryly logical application and
implies that a substantial interest (however unorthodox) may not hereafter
by injured without the requirements of prior notice and the opportunity
to be heard.
M. Russell Kruse, Jr.
"See Reich, supra note 45, at 1255.
" Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' See note 83 supra.
"In a lengthy written debate between Kenneth Culp Davis and Raoul Berger, § 20(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), was the main topic of dis-
pute. See (chronologically): Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965); 4 DAVIS S 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Berger, Administrative Arbi-
trariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966); Davis, Administra-
tive Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816(1966); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967).
'" See note 94 supra.
"See note 83 supra.
'7401 U.S. 371 (1971).
"1Id. at 379-80.
" The compilation and maintenance of dossiers on student radicals and other domestic
surveillance by Government agencies, such as the U.S. Army, could be very damaging to an
individual who has no chance to defend against the allegations. However, the Government
could possibly hide behind the cloak of "national security" as an overriding interest. See
note 19 supra. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1971, at 15, col. 1; id., Feb. 24, 1971,
at 1, col. 5. At least two elected officials have said they will offer a citizen's privacy bill
that would permit individuals to have access to all government files kept on them, to have
the right to rebut derogatory statements therein, and to limit disclosure of that data without
their permission. Id., Feb. 26, 1971, a 8, col. 3; id., Feb. 24, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
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